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Although it is clear according to the text that the 16 federal states have been empowered to establish ethics committees within theirjurisdictions, this does not mean that the state governments are free to transfer exclusive authority in the matter to their respective medical associations, a step that would effectively abolish Germany's private ethics committees. First, the legislation does not rule out the authorization ofprivate ethics committees. Second, as legal scholars attest, the exclusive control ofethics committees by the medical associations would constitute an illegal monopoly. Third, it is arguable that medical-association ethics committees fail to meet the one priorfederal requirement, that of independence.
There is a great deal of confusion in Germany today about which kinds of ethics committees (public and/or private) the states will sanction before 17 August 1995. In an attempt to sort things out we present a brief explanation of how there came to be two kinds of ethics committees in Germany, review the legal battle between the two over the issue of authorization, point out how the German legislature, in passing the recent bill, has missed an opportunity to clarify the issue and, finally, suggest why the administration ofethics committees by the medical associations may be incompatible with the requirement that ethics committees be independent.
I: Origin of the controversy mid-seventies Germany's medical associations responded with foot-dragging to the idea of ethics committees (2). This should not be thought incriminating, as it may simply reflect both a deeper commitment to personal responsibility and an understandable interest in avoiding anything suggestive of unwieldy bureaucracy. Nonetheless, these ten years proved pivotal to the development of ethics committees in Germany. For 'The design and performance of any experimental procedure involving human subjects should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol, which should be transmitted to a specially appointed independent committee for consideration, comment and guidance' (7).
Nonetheless, it wasn't until eleven years later (1986) that the German legislature answered to one half of this recommendation, adding Nr 7a to section 40 ' The clinical investigation of a drug involving human subjects may be carried out if and only if: la) those intending to carry out the study first obtain the written opinion of an independent and interdisciplinary ethics committee, which is registered at the Federal Health Agency and whose members are suitably qualified for the task of reviewing the study protocol and other required documents from ethical and legal points of view. Registration shall entail the drafting and publication of procedural rules wherein an appropriate honorarium and the names, addresses and qualifications of the members are expressly stated. In the case of multicentre studies a single vote shall be regarded as sufficient. Liability for the clinical study shall remain with those who sponsor and carry out the study' (9).
The adoption of this proposal would have placed regulatory authority over matters concerning ethics committees in the hands of a single federal agency, would have promoted a high degree of standardization through the application of specific criteria concerning ethics-committee composition and operating procedures, would presumably have allowed for the authorization of private ethics committees, and may, depending upon the agency's construal of 'independent', also have allowed for the authorization of ethics committees affiliated with the medical associations.
While 
IV: The problem of the monopoly
The explanation of why the issue of authorization is not simply and straightforwardly a matter of state discretion is as follows. First, the law empowers the state legislatures, and not the medical associations, to specify the formal requirements that are to apply to ethics committees. The taking up of this task by the medical associations through the instrument of their own by-laws would be an unconstitutional elaboration of the AMG. Only the legislature has the authority to elaborate the AMG (10).
Second, if the state legislatures, in drafting the formal requirements that are to apply to ethics committees, specify that the medical associations and faculties of medicine alone are permitted to assume the task of reviewing clinical studies from legal and ethical points of view, the result will be a public-law monopoly, at odds with the German constitution and with European Community regulations, both of which protect the rights of third parties against such monopolies.
Taking the representatives of pharmaceutical companies as an example of a third party illustrates the issue. Pharmaceutical companies assume the responsibility and financial risks of developing drugs. They are bound by law to conduct clinical trials, and to see to it that these trials are carried out according to the law. In case of non-compliance they (their representatives) face the threat of prison sentences of up to one year and financial penalties of up to DM 50,000 (1 1). In light of this responsibility they ought to have the freedom to call upon the ethics committee in which they have the most confidence, and not be bound to a certain ethics committee on account of an existing monopoly.
Furthermore, assuming that the state legislatures issue precise and comprehensive formal requirements in establishing which ethics committees are eligible for authorization (the Bundestag's proposal recommends itself), it would be difficult to defend the view that there is no credible alternative to medical-association ethics committees, a situation that would justify a monopoly (12).
V: Independence
In our view the legislative decision to grant regulatory authority in the matter of ethics committees to the states is out of step with the international nature of medical science, and, more importantly, with a common commitment in Europe and elsewhere to notions of procedural justice that relate to the composition and modus operandi of ethics committees. For instance, requiring that ethics committees make provision for female and lay-person representation, and requiring that committee members appear in person for oral discussion may be ways of adjusting the form and procedure of review so as to improve, other things being equal, the likelihood of just decisions. At a time when some would see the validity of these principles affirmed through their adoption into binding international (European-wide) regulations, the German legislature has left them, and to some extent the whole issue of a European-wide unification of regulations, to the authority of the various federal states.
But one principle of procedural justice having to do with the regulation of ethics committees and the ability of these ethics committees adequately to represent the public was not left to the discretion of state authority. In keeping with the laws of almost every European country the new German Drug Law also stipulates that ethics committees must be independent. Indeed, whereas much of the importance widely attached to the WMA's Declaration of Helsinki relates to the repugnance felt about too many cases of mistreatment and abuse found in the history of medicine, and the determination to prevent any more such cases, the very idea of setting up ethics committees to assume a guardian role in preventing abuse in the medical world -a world increasingly perceived as alien by the general public, even as its events have a profounder societal impact -suggests scrutiny from an independent perspective.
With this in mind we would suggest that there is a presumption in favour of not allowing medical associations to administrate ethics committees. To be sure, medical expertise is indispensable to the assessment of the facts of medical research. But this requires only that appropriately qualified physicians be appointed to ethics committees as members who share the task of reviewing research from legal and ethical points of view, not that ethics committees be operated by medical associations.
The two main concerns are a lack of professional independence and a lack of organizational independence. The 
